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Abstract
Modern ad auctions allow advertisers to target more specific segments of the user population. Un-
fortunately, this is not always in the best interest of the ad platform – partially hiding some information
could be more beneficial for the platform’s revenue. In this paper, we examine the following basic ques-
tion in the context of second-price ad auctions: how should an ad platform optimally reveal information
about the ad opportunity to the advertisers in order to maximize revenue? We consider a model in which
bidders’ valuations depend on a random state of the ad opportunity. Different from previous work, we
focus on a more practical, and challenging, situation where the space of possible realizations of ad oppor-
tunities is extremely large. We thus focus on developing algorithms whose running time is polynomial
in the number of bidders, but is independent of the number of ad opportunity realizations.
We assume that the auctioneer can commit to a signaling scheme to reveal noisy information about
the realized state of the ad opportunity, and examine the auctioneer’s algorithmic question of design-
ing the optimal signaling scheme. We first consider that the auctioneer is restricted to send a public
signal to all bidders. As a warm-up, we start with a basic (though less realistic) setting in which the
auctioneer knows the bidders’ valuations, and show that an ǫ-optimal scheme can be implemented in
time polynomial in the number of bidders and 1/ǫ. We then move to a well-motivated Bayesian valua-
tion setting in which the auctioneer and bidders both have private information, and present two results.
First, we exhibit a characterization result regarding approximately optimal schemes and prove that any
constant-approximate public signaling scheme must use exponentially many signals. Second, we present
a “simple” public signaling scheme that serves as a constant approximation under mild assumptions.
Finally, we initiate an exploration on the power of being able to send different signals privately to
different bidders. In the basic setting where the auctioneer knows bidders’ valuations, we exhibit a
polynomial-time private scheme that extracts almost full surplus even in the worst Bayes Nash equilib-
rium. This illustrates the surprising power of private signaling schemes in extracting revenue.
∗Part of this work was conducted while Haifeng Xu was an intern at Google Research, Mountain View, CA. We would like to
thank Inbal Talgam-Cohen and Konstantin Zabarnyi for pointing out an inaccuracy in the proof of Lemma C.3 in an earlier version
of the paper.
1 Introduction
Every single day, through various online advertising platforms, advertisers’ ads are seen by billions of web
users. Each ad opportunity, usually associated with a randomly arrived web user, can be depicted by various
characteristics of the web user. A particular advantage of online advertising is that it can allow advertisers
to target specific user populations. To do so, the platform (i.e., the auctioneer) can selectively reveal some
characteristics of the web user to advertisers (i.e., bidders). For example, the function of allowing adver-
tisers to set different keywords and bids for different ad campaigns, as permitted by most ad platforms, is
essentially equivalent to revealing partial information to advertisers before their bidding. Features like these
have motivated the following basic question in ad auctions: how much information regarding the web user
should the platform reveal to advertisers? This is particularly important given increasingly refined informa-
tion about web users known by today’s ad platforms like Facebook or Google. In this paper, we examine
this question under the objective of maximizing the auctioneer’s revenue.
Like [12, 5], we focus on the single-item second-price auction and assume that each advertiser’s valu-
ation for the ad opportunity depends on a common random state of nature. A natural interpretation of the
state of nature is the characterization of the randomly arrived web user, which affects advertisers’ valuations
for the ad opportunity. The state of nature is drawn from a common-knowledge prior distribution, however
only the auctioneer can observe its realization. We model the auctioneer’s information revelation policy as
a signaling scheme, which is a randomized map from the realized state of nature to a set of signals. There
are two natural signaling models: public and private signaling schemes. In a public signaling scheme, the
auctioneer is constrained to send a public signal to bidders, therefore each bidder performs a Bayesian up-
date and reaches a common posterior belief regarding the state of nature. When the auctioneer is allowed to
send different signals to different bidders, the signaling scheme is private.
We consider both the known valuation and Bayesian valuation settings. In the known valuation setting,
the auctioneer knows bidders’ values at any given realized state. Though admittedly less realistic, the known
valuation setting is a natural first step for studying signaling in auctions and has been examined by several
previous works [12, 5, 18]. In the (more realistic) Bayesian valuation setting, we assume that each bidder’s
value depends on a random private bidder type that is unknown to the auctioneer. To account for bidders’
strategic behaviors in the auction, we adopt the dominant-strategy truth-telling equilibrium whenever it
exists, and otherwise, the worst Bayes Nash equilibrium (particularly, in private signaling schemes). We
remark that the signaling schemes considered in [12, 5] are all public.
When designing signaling schemes for modern ad auctions, a primary computational challenge is the
large diversity of web users that an ad opportunity might correspond to. Web users vary in their interests,
demographics, browsing history, etc. In the advertising system, such user information is usually captured
by thousands of features and each of their (exponentially many) configurations could possibly be realized.
Translated to the model, this means that the space of possible realizations of the state of nature can be
extremely large. One key difference between our work and previous work on signaling in auctions is that
we take into account this challenge of extremely large number of states of nature, and restrict our attention
to algorithms with running time independent of this parameter.
We note that signaling naturally relates to targeting in ad auctions. In fact, as we will elaborate later, the
Bayesian valuation setting we consider is motivated by the ad auction feature called re-targeting. A signaling
scheme essentially specifies the extent to which each advertiser can target the web users. Unsurprisingly,
it is usually not in the best interest of the auctioneer to reveal full information to advertisers: over refined
targeting can result in fewer advertisers competing for the ad opportunity and possible a large gap between
the highest and second-highest bid [18, 20]. This is detrimental to the revenue in second price auctions.
On the other hand, completely obscuring user information is also suboptimal since advertisers will bid
conservatively due to their uncertainty regarding the value of the ad opportunity. Our goal is thus to design
optimal signaling schemes that properly balance the amount of competition and bidders’ valuations in the
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auction. Next, we elaborate our results in detail.1
1.1 Our Models and Results
We first consider the design of optimal public signaling schemes. As a warm-up, we start with the known-
valuation setting and show that a simple Monte-Carlo algorithm implements an ǫ-optimal public scheme and
runs in poly(n, 1ǫ ) time where n is the number of bidders. Note that this setting is also studied by [12, 5],
however the running time of their algorithms depends polynomially on the number of states of nature.
Next, wemove to a natural Bayesian-valuation model motivated by re-targeting. Re-targeting is a feature
in ad auctions that allows each advertiser to target a set of web users (e.g., those who visited the advertiser’s
website) and use a different bid for users from that set.2 In this setting, the state of nature is a vector of binary
feature θi ∈ {0, 1} for each bidder i, indicating whether the web user is the bidder’s targeted ones or not.
Therefore, the number of possible states is exponential in the number of bidders. We assume that bidder i’s
valuation is determined by θi and a private bidder type that is i.i.d. across bidders. Note however, θi’s may
be correlated since some bidders may target similar items. For this Bayesian-valuation model, we first prove
that any public signaling scheme that uses sub-exponentially many signals can not guarantee any constant
fraction of the optimal revenue. We note that, though not a measure of computational complexity, the number
of signals can be viewed as a natural complexity measure of the signaling scheme, which is analogous to the
menu-size complexity studied in the optimal mechanism design literature [16, 29, 2]. Complementing this
result, we show a signaling scheme that serves as a constant approximation under mild assumptions. Our
scheme is “simple” to implement and tracks the following conventional wisdom. In particular, it reveals full
information to bidders whenever there is enough competition in the auction and otherwise, it pools bidders
to form competition by selectively obscuring information.
Finally, we initiate an exploration on the power of private signaling schemes, which to the best of our
knowledge has not been studied in the context of auctions. We first exhibit an example showing that the
optimal private scheme can outperform the optimal public scheme arbitrarily in terms of the auctioneer’s
revenue. This motivates the algorithmic question of computing the optimal private signaling scheme. Here,
we restrict our attention to the known-valuation setting, which is basic but already reveals sufficient non-
triviality due to intricate equilibrium bidding behaviors and the equilibrium selection issue. We present a
polynomial-time private signaling scheme that extracts almost the full surplus even in the worst Bayes Nash
equilibrium. This illustrates the surprising power of private signaling schemes in extracting revenue.
1.2 Additional Related Work
The study of information asymmetry in auctions dates back as early as 1980s [25, 23, 21, 22]. In a seminal
paper, Milgrom and Weber [22] prove that in common-value auctions with bidders of symmetric random
signals, among all public signaling schemes, revealing full information maximizes the auctioneer’s revenue
in most commonly seen auction formats (i.e., descending, ascending, second-price and first-price auctions).
However, later work has observed that such full transparency is not optimal in general, and the auctioneer
could increase revenue by revealing partial information to bidders [24, 6, 14, 26]. This has motivated a surge
of recent interest in the algorithmic question of computing the optimal signaling scheme that maximizes
revenue in a given auction format. Fu et al. [15] prove that revealing full information is optimal, among all
public schemes, in Myerson’s optimal auction. However, the optimal scheme is usually a non-trivial one
1Note that though our work is primarily motivated by ad auctions, our results are applicable to any second-price auction with
large number of possible item realizations.
2Re-targeting is allowed in several ad platforms including Google’s and Facebook’s. Each advertiser will specify a targeted set
of web users (usually using their user IDs) in the platform system. When a web user arrives, the platform informs each bidder
whether the user is in their targeted set or not. Then each bidder submits a bid. We refer curious readers to the help pages from
various companies for more details, e.g., https://support.google.com/adwords/answer/1704368?hl=en.
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and involves randomization in second price auctions [12, 5]. Recently, Daskalakis et al. [8] characterize the
optimal joint design of the signaling scheme and auction mechanism.
To our knowledge, Emek et al. [12], Bro Miltersen and Sheffet [5] are the first to study optimal signaling
design in the known-valuation setting. They observe a linear program for computing the optimal public
scheme in time polynomial in the number of bidders and states of nature. However, this is not satisfactory
for ad auctions since the space of all possible states of nature is usually extremely large. It is generally
impractical to solve such a large LP quickly. Though not explicitly stated, Hummel and McAfee [18] also
study the known-valuation setting with exponentially many states of nature. However, they do not consider
the design of optimal signaling but instead compare the revenue between two simple schemes, i.e., revealing
no information or full information.
Emek et al. [12] also study the Bayesian valuation setting, though in a more idealized model. Specifi-
cally, they assume that given a state of nature, the auctioneer’s uncertainty regarding the bidders’s valuation
is captured by a distribution over polynomially many value profiles. This is somewhat restrictive since the
space of value profiles typically increases exponentially in the number of bidders. However, even under this
simplification, it is shown that computing the optimal public signaling scheme is NP-hard. In a follow-up
work, Cheng et al. [7] derive a PTAS for the Bayesian model of [12]. Their algorithm crucially relies on the
fact that there are polynomially many states of nature, thus does not apply to our setting.
All the mentioned algorithmic work so far focuses on public signaling. Recent work of [1, 3, 10] studies
optimal private signaling for agents with no inter-dependence. Therefore, given a signal, each agent makes a
decision that is independent of others. The problem usually becomes more intricate when there are strategic
interactions among agents (e.g., in an auction). Bergemann and Morris [4] characterize the distributions
of players’ action profiles at equilibrium under an asymmetric information structure as the set of Bayes
correlated equilibria. To our knowledge, there has not been much progress on the design of optimal private
signaling in such strategic settings. Taneva [27] characterizes the optimal private signaling in a two-agent
two-action game. Vasserman et al. [28] consider private signaling in non-atomic routing, and focus on
analyzing the cost decrease via private signaling in a graph of parallel links.
2 Preliminaries
2.1 The Model
We focus on the single-item second price auction, which is widely adopted by ad exchange platforms for
selling display ads, video ads, etc. Let n denote the total number of bidders (“he” or “them”). Vector
v = v(θ) ∈ Rn+ denotes the profile of bidders’ valuations which depends on a random state of nature θ. We
assume that the state of nature is a-priori unknown to the bidders, and drawn from a common-knowledge
prior distribution λ supported on set Θ. The auctioneer (“she”), on the other hand, can observe the realized
θ. For ease of presentation, we assume Θ is finite, though this is not crucial for our results. In ad auctions, θ
could encode the information of a web page viewer (e.g., demographic information, browsing history, etc.),
which is known to the auctioneer. We call this the Known-Valuation Setting (KVS) since in this case, the
auctioneer is certain about each bidder’s value after observing θ. We use vi(θ) to denote bidder i’s value
and Vi = {vi(θ) : θ ∈ Θ} is its support. Naturally, v(θ) ∈ V =
∏n
i=1 Vi for any θ. We assume the set
Θ to be extremely large, and will focus on algorithms with running time independent of |Θ|. However, any
algorithm can query the distribution λ for the probability λθ of a state θ and can also sample from λ.
We also study the Bayesian-Valuation Setting (BVS), in which bidders’ values have two-sided uncer-
tainties. Motivated by the re-targeting feature in ad auctions, we focus on a basic model in which the state
of nature consists of a binary feature θi ∈ {0, 1} for each bidder i, indicating whether the item is among
bidder i’s targeted ones or not. Therefore, θ = (θ1, ..., θn) ∈ {0, 1}n = Θ. We assume bidder i’s value
vi = v(θi, ti) is a function of θi and a private bidder type ti, which bidder i is privy to, but is unknown
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to the auctioneer. Instead, the auctioneer only knows the prior distribution of ti. We assume that the bid-
der type ti’s are independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.). Therefore, vi = v(1, ti) follows the same
distribution for each i, denoted as H(v), and vi = v(0, ti) follows another distribution L(v). We also call
H[L] the high [low] distribution for convenience, since it corresponds to the value distribution of targeted
[un-targeted] items. W.l.o.g., assume Ev∼H [v] > Ev∼L[v]. Notice however, we allow the binary feature
θi’s to be correlated since some bidders may target similar items. If, moreover, {θi}i∈[n] are also i.i.d., we
say the bidders are symmetric.
2.2 Signaling Schemes
We assume that the auctioneer can commit to a signaling scheme that reveals noisy information about the
realized θ. A signaling scheme ϕ is a randomized map from the states in Θ to a set of signals Σ. We
use ϕ(θ, σ) to denote the probability of selecting the signal σ ∈ Σ given the state θ. Notice that ϕ is
public knowledge. An algorithm implements signaling scheme ϕ if it takes as input a state of nature θ, and
outputs σ with probability ϕ(θ, σ). Our goal is to design efficient and (approximately) optimal revenue-
maximizing signaling schemes. When ϕ yields expected revenue within an additive [multiplicative] ǫ of the
best possible, we say it is ǫ-optimal [ǫ-approximate] in the additive [multiplicative] sense. We consider two
natural signaling models.
Public Signaling Schemes. In a public signaling scheme, the auctioneer is only allowed to send a public
signal, so that each bidder infers the same information. Let ασ =
∑
θ∈Θ λθϕ(θ, σ) denote the probability
of sending the public signal σ. Upon receiving σ, bidders infer a common posterior distribution of θ by
Bayesian updating. In particular, Pr(θ|σ) = λθϕ(θ, σ)/ασ . In the known-valuation setting, we use
v(σ) = E
θ|σ
[v(θ)] =
1
ασ
∑
θ
λθϕ(θ, σ) · v(θ)
to denote the expected value profile conditioned on signal σ, and vi(σ) is bidder i’s conditional expected
value. Observe that, conditioned on receiving the public signal σ, bidding vi(σ) is the dominant strategy
for each bidder i (see, e.g., [12]) in the second price auction. Our goal is to maximize the auctioneer’s
expected revenue at the (unique) dominant-strategy truth-telling equilibrium, expressed as follows in the
known-valuation setting:
KVS: Rev(ϕ) =
∑
σ∈Σ
ασ ·max2
i
[vi(σ)] =
∑
σ∈Σ
max2
i
[∑
θ
λθϕ(θ, σ) · vi(θ)
]
where the function max2 returns the second largest value of a given set or vector. The following lemma
shows that an optimal public signaling does not need to use more than n(n − 1) signals in the known-
valuation setting. The proof follows a simple revelation-principal-type argument.
Lemma 2.1. (Adapted from [19, 12]) There always exists an optimal public signaling scheme in the known-
valuation setting that uses at most n(n− 1) signals, with signal σij (i 6= j ∈ [n]) resulting in bidder i [j] as
the bidder with the highest [second-highest] value.
In the Bayesian-valuation setting, the description of a public signaling scheme remains the same. There-
fore, the expected revenue is expressed similarly, but with an additional expectation over the randomness of
bidder’s private types.
BVS: Rev(ϕ) = E
t1,...,tn
[∑
σ∈Σ
max2
i
[∑
θ
λθϕ(θ, σ) · v(θi, ti)
]]
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We remark that Lemma 2.1 does not hold in the Bayesian-valuation setting. Actually, in sharp contrast
to Lemma 2.1, we prove in Section 4 that in BVS, any public signaling scheme using sub-exponentially
many signals cannot guarantee even a constant fraction of the optimal revenue.
Note that among all public signaling schemes, the one that maximizes the social welfare is to reveal
full information to bidders, in both known-valuation and Bayesian-valuation settings [11]. Moreover, the
optimal welfare is always an upper bound for the optimal revenue of public signaling. We remark that
though the signaling model assumes that each bidder knows the prior distribution and signaling scheme, in
practice bidder i only needs to know his conditional valuation vi(σ) = Eθ|σ vi(θ) on signal σ in order to
figure out his optimal bid. vi(σ) can be estimated within good precision by samples (i.e., interacting with
the system for enough times).
Private Signaling Schemes. In a private signaling scheme, the auctioneer is allowed to send different
(possibly correlated) signals to different bidders. That is, bidders are asymmetrically informed. After re-
ceiving the private signal, each bidder updates his own belief regarding θ. Obviously, the public signaling
scheme is a special class of private signaling schemes. We will restrict our attention to the known-valuation
setting when studying private signaling schemes. An important observation regarding private signaling is
that bidding the conditional expected value is generally not an equilibrium strategy for bidders. Moreover,
the phenomenon of winner’s curse may arise when bidders are asymmetrically informed, as illustrated in
the following example.
Example 2.2 (Non-Truthfulness and Winner’s Curse in Private Signaling). Consider a second-price auction
with 2 bidders in the known-valuation setting. There are two possible value profiles, as listed in the following
table together with corresponding probabilities.
bidder 1 bidder 2
prob 0.5 1 2
prob 0.5 7 7
Consider the private signaling scheme that reveals the realized profile (i.e., full information) to bidder 2
but reveals no information to bidder 1. Since bidder 2 knows her value exactly, bidding the true value is the
dominant strategy for bidder 2. Given no information, bidder 1 has an expected value of 4, which however
is not her equilibrium bid. In fact, bidder 1 will not bid any value between 2 and 7 since in this case she can
only win at the less-valued situation – the winner’s curse. The equilibrium bid for bidder 1 turns out to be
any bid under 2 and there are infinitely many equilibria under this private signaling scheme.
Example 2.2 reveals several challenges for computing the optimal private signaling scheme. The first
is the equilibrium selection problem due to the existence of multiple equilibria, as illustrated by Example
2.2. There is usually not a natural equilibrium selection rule in private signaling. Second, even if we know
which equilibrium to adopt, computing a desired equilibrium is non-trivial in second-price auctions with
asymmetrically informed bidders. In fact, most prior work is only able to characterize equilibria under
restrictive assumptions, e.g., two bidders, common valuation [17, 13, 26].
3 Warm-up: Public Signaling in the Known-Valuation Setting
We start with the design of the optimal public signaling scheme in the known-valuation setting, and prove
the following theorem.
Theorem 3.1. Assume v(θ) ∈ [0, 1]n for all θ. An (additive) ǫ-optimal signaling scheme can be implemented
in poly(n, 1ǫ ) time. In particular, the running time is independent of |Θ|.
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The proof of Theorem 3.1 combines and generalizes two ideas from previous literature. We present a
sketch here, while defer the full proof to Appendix A. First, as observed in [12, 5], there is a poly(n, |Θ|)-
sized linear program that explicitly computes the optimal public signaling scheme. Specifically, by Lemma
2.1, we can w.l.o.g. assume Σ = {σij}i 6=j∈[n] in which σij results in bidder i [j] to have the highest
[second-highest] expected value. Then Linear Program (1) with variables ϕ(θ, σ) computes the optimal
public signaling scheme. However, any naive approach for solving LP (1) requires poly(n, |Θ|) time, which
is prohibitive when |Θ| is extremely large. To overcome this challenge, we employ a similar Monte-Carlo
sampling algorithm as proposed by Dughmi and Xu [9]. In particular, given as input a state of nature
θ, we take poly(n, 1ǫ ) many samples from λ, and let λ˜ be the empirical distribution over these samples
plus the given state θ. The algorithm then solves the linear program by instead using λ˜ as the prior and
relaxing the first two constraints of LP (1) by 1/poly(1/ǫ, n) (since the samples cannot exactly preserve
these constraints), and signals for θ as suggested by the solution of the LP.
maximize
∑
σij∈Σ
∑
θ∈Θ λθϕ(θ, σ
ij)vj(θ)
subject to
∑
θ∈Θ λθϕ(θ, σ
ij)vi(θ) ≥
∑
θ∈Θ λθϕ(θ, σ
ij)vj(θ), for j 6= i.∑
θ∈Θ λθϕ(θ, σ
ij)vj(θ) ≥
∑
θ∈Θ λθϕ(θ, σ
ij)vk(θ), for k 6= i, j; j 6= i.∑
σij∈Σ ϕ(θ, σ) = 1, for θ ∈ Θ.
ϕ(θ, σij) ≥ 0, for θ ∈ Θ, σij ∈ Σ.
(1)
We remark that though the idea for our Monte-Carlo algorithm is similar to that in [9], the analysis there
does not directly apply to our setting. Particularly, the algorithm in [9] gives a bi-criteria FPTAS for the
Bayesian persuasion problem (i.e., ǫ-loss in both optimality and incentive compatibility), and they prove that
the bi-criteria loss is inevitable in their setting due to information-theoretic reasons. However, our algorithm
is a single-criteria FPTAS and its analysis relies on the special property of the revenue objective.
4 Public Signaling in the Bayesian-Valuation Setting
In this section, we turn our attention to the more realistic Bayesian valuation setting, and consider the design
of optimal public signaling schemes. We focus on a basic yet well-motivated model, i.e., θ = {θ1, ..., θn} ∈
{0, 1}n and bidder i’s private information is captured by a type ti which is i.i.d. across bidders. Note
however, θi’s can be correlated. When θi = 1, bidder i’s value vi = v(1, ti) follows a common (high)
distribution H(v) for every i. Similarly, vi = v(0, ti) follows the (low) distribution L(v). We assume
w.l.o.g Ev∼H [v] > Ev∼L[v]. If, moreover, θi’s are i.i.d., we say that bidders are symmetric.
4.1 Lower Bounding the Number of Signals Required by Approximately Optimal Schemes
We first bound the minimum number of signals required by any approximately optimal public signaling
scheme. This is an important feature not only because it is a basic property regarding the optimal scheme
but also it serves as a natural complexity measure of the optimal scheme, which is analogous to the menu-size
complexity studied in the recent mechanism design literature [16, 29, 2]. Several previous works have es-
tablished polynomial-size upper bounds on the number of signals required by the optimal scheme in various
settings [19, 12, 5]. In contrast, we prove that in our Bayesian-valuation setting, it is generally necessary to
use exponentially many signals, even when only a constant-approximate public signaling scheme is sought.
Theorem 4.1. In the Bayesian-valuation setting with n symmetric bidders, any public signaling scheme
using 2o(n
1/4) signals cannot guarantee any constant (multiplicative) fraction of the optimal revenue.
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We remark that Theorem 4.1 is not a computational hardness result, though it does indicate some chal-
lenges in designing the optimal public signaling scheme for the BVS setting. The proof of Theorem 4.1 is
rather involved. We defer the full proof to Appendix B, and only present a sketch here.
The proof examines the following instance in the symmetric bidder setting: there are n bidders and each
bidder’s valuation follows either a (high) Bernoulli distribution with success probability 1√
n
(when θi = 1)
or a (low) point distribution at 0 (when θi = 0); θi’s are i.i.d. with Pr(θi = 1) = ǫ for a small constant ǫ.
The proof is divided into two steps. We first show that the revenue of the optimal public signaling
scheme is at least 1−o(1). Intuitively, this is because when revealing full information, with high probability
there are Ω(ǫn) bidders having the high value distribution and such competition results in a revenue close to
1. Second, we argue that the revenue of any public signaling scheme using 2o(n
1/4) signals must be far less
than 1. The main technical challenge we overcome is in the second step: given an arbitrary public signaling
scheme using at most N signals, we look to upper bound its revenue in terms of N .
In fact, instead of upper bounding the revenue, we upper bound the welfare of an arbitrary public sig-
naling scheme using at most N signals since the revenue is then trivially upper bounded by the welfare.
We first observe that among the public signaling schemes with at most N signals that achieve the maxi-
mum welfare, there is always a deterministic one that deterministically maps a state to a signal. Such a
deterministic scheme can be viewed as a partition of Θ = 2[n] into N subsets, denoted as {Si}Ni=1. Let
Pr(Si) =
∑
θ∈Si λθ denote the total probability mass of the states in set Si. We then prove the following
key lemma (informal): for any Si, either the welfare conditioned on Si is O(ǫ) or Pr(Si) is exponentially
small (specifically, Pr(Si) ≤ 2−Θ(n1/4)). This lemma implies that any deterministic scheme with 2o(n1/4)
signals must have O(ǫ) welfare. The proof of the lemma involves intricate combinatorial analysis. At a high
level, we view each state θ as a binary vector and let θ denotes the expectation of the θ’s in Si. Note that
each entry of θ has expectation ǫ a-priori. We show that if m is the number of entries in θ that are at least
2ǫ, then Pr(Si) ≤ e−2
√
m. Intuitively, this is because the sum of the expectation of these m entries is ǫm,
so the probability that the sum is at least 2ǫm should be small. However, the concrete argument is more
involved since we have to argue for an arbitrary deterministic set Si while not a sampled one. Since the
high distribution is a Bernoulli with success probability 1/
√
n, ifm = o(
√
n), the welfare from θ would be
O(ǫ); otherwise m = Ω(
√
n) implying Pr(Si) ≤ 2−Θ(n1/4). This yields a proof sketch of the key lemma.
4.2 A Constant Approximate Scheme
In this section, we present a “simple” scheme that serves as a constant approximation under mild assump-
tions. We start by showing that revealing full information – which indeed uses exponentially many signals
– can be arbitrarily far from optimality.
Example 4.2 (Failure of the Full Information Scheme). Consider the following simple example: the value of
each bidder either follows the (high) uniform distribution in [0, 1] (denoted as U [0, 1]) or follows the (low)
point distribution at 0. The state of nature is a uniformly drawn bidder whose value follows U [0, 1] while all
other bidders have valuation 0. Only the auctioneer knows which bidder has a high value distribution. If the
auctioneer reveals full information, the revenue is 0 since only one bidder has a non-zero valuation. On the
other hand, consider the following signaling scheme: send a pooling signal σ2i−1,2i for i ∈ 1, 2, ..., ⌊n/2⌋
when either bidder 2i − 1 or 2i has the high value distribution. That is, the scheme pools bidder 2i − 1
and bidder 2i to create competition. Now from bidders’ perspective, whenever the pooling signal σ2i−1,2i is
sent, bidder 2i−1 and 2i know that their valuations are drawn from U([0, 1]) with probability 0.5 and are 0
otherwise. As a result, bidder 2i− 1 and 2i have expected value distribution U([0, 0.5]). Some calculation
reveals that the expected revenue conditioned on signal σ2i−1,2i is 1/6, which is arbitrarily better than 0.
Revisiting Example 4.2, we note that the failure of the full information scheme there is due to the lack
of competition. In particular, by revealing full information, the realized state includes only one non-zero-
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valued bidder, resulting in 0 revenue. We call these the tail states, meaning the extreme situation with little
competition in the auction. More specifically, we call the states in Θ1 = {θ : |θ| = 1} the tail states.
The high-revenue scheme described in Example 4.2 pools bidders to create competition at these tail states.
Obviously, this is not always possible for any prior distribution λ. For example, if λ is a point distribution
supported at the tail state θ = (1, 0, 0, ..., 0), then we cannot pool θ with any other tail states.
We thus first characterize when such tail-pooling is possible. Since the state of nature θ is in {0, 1}n,
for convenience we sometimes view θ as a set of bidders specified by entries of value 1. Therefore, each tail
state can be treated as a bidder and Θ1 can be treated as the set of all bidders [n]. We would like to pair the
tail states inΘ1 (possibly randomly) in a way such that each bidder in a pair has equal probability mass (like
the scheme in Example 4.2). Such a pooling scheme can be captured by a randomized map π : Θ1 → Θ1
which maps any given state θ ∈ Θ1 to the state that it will be paired with. Let π(θ, θ′) denote the probability
of mapping θ to θ′. The feasible pooling scheme π’s are captured by the following linear system.∑
θ′∈Θ1 π(θ, θ
′) = 1, for i ∈ Θ1.
λθ · π(θ, θ′) = λθ′ · π(θ′, θ), for θ, θ′ ∈ Θ1.
π(θ, θ′) ≥ 0 and π(θ, θ) = 0, for θ, θ′ ∈ Θ1.
(2)
Particularly, the second constraint guarantees that conditioned on that θ, θ′ are pooled together, they will
have equal probability mass. As pointed out earlier, linear system (2) is not always feasible and its feasibility
depends on the portion of λ on set Θ1. The following lemma shows that under a minor assumption on λ,
linear system (2) is guaranteed to be feasible. The proof of Lemma 4.3 can be found in Appendix C.1.
Lemma 4.3. Linear system (2) is feasible if and only if for any θ ∈ Θ1, λθ ≤
∑
θ′∈Θ1:θ′ 6=θ λθ′ .
In other words, there exists a feasible pooling scheme if no state inΘ1 has probability mass that is larger
than the sum of all other states’ probability masses. In this case, we say λ is tail-balanced. Particularly, λ
is tail-balanced if λθ ≤
∑
θ′∈Θ1:θ′ 6=θ λθ′ for any θ ∈ Θ1. It is easy to see that a feasible pooling scheme
(if exists) can be computed efficiently. Utilizing any feasible pooling scheme, we consider the signaling
scheme that simply reveals θ unless θ ∈ Θ1 in which case it pools θ with another θ′ ∈ Θ1 using a pooling
scheme. The details are in Algorithm 1, which we term the tail-pooling signaling scheme.
Algorithm 1 Tail-Pooling Signaling Scheme for Bayesian Valuation Setting
Parameter: any feasible pooling scheme π.
Input: State of nature θ ∈ {0, 1}n.
Output: Signal σ
1: if |θ|1 ≥ 2 or |θ|1 = 0 then
2: σ = θ;
3: else
4: Pooling tail states: sample θ′ ∈ Θ1 with probability π(θ, θ′), and let σ = {θ, θ′};
5: end if
6: return σ.
The output of Algorithm 1 simply either reveals the true state (when σ = θ) or reveals a set of two
states (when σ = {θ, θ′}). Conditioned on σ = {θ, θ′}, the state θ and θ′ show up both with probability
1/2, as imposed by the second constraint in linear system (2). The following theorem shows that under mild
assumptions, Algorithm 1 serves as a constant approximation to the optimal public signaling scheme.
Theorem 4.4. Assume the high and low distributions satisfy the monotone hazard rate (MHR) condition
and λ is tail-balanced. When n ≥ 22, Algorithm 1 achieves revenue that is at least 18 fraction of the optimal
welfare, thus is a 18 -approximate revenue-maximizing signaling scheme.
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Observe that the optimal welfare is obtained by revealing full information, thus is the expectation of the
welfare at each state. Theorem 4.4 is proved by showing that for every state θ ∈ Θ, the revenue at θ in
Algorithm 1 is at least 1/8 fraction of the welfare at θ in the full information scheme. The following lemma
summarizes the concrete bounds for different cases. Utilizing MHR properties, our proof establishes various
inequalities comparing the welfare and revenue of a standard second price auction when each bidder’s value
is drawn independently from the high or low value distribution. The details are relegated to Appendix C.2.
Lemma 4.5. For any θ ∈ Θ, let Revpool(θ) denote the revenue of the tail-pooling signaling scheme in
Algorithm 1 at state of nature θ and Welfull(θ) denote the welfare of the full information scheme at state
of nature θ. Then:
1. When |θ| = 0 and n ≥ 2, Revpool(θ) ≥ max{13 , ln(n+1)−1ln(n+1) } ·Welfull(θ).
2. When |θ| ≥ 2 and n ≥ 22, Revpool(θ) ≥ max{16 , ln(|θ|+1)−12 ln(|θ|+1) } ·Welfull(θ).
3. When |θ| = 1 and n ≥ 22, Revpool(θ) ≥ 18 ·Welfull(θ).
Remark 4.6. Theorem 4.4 conveys an interesting conceptual message. That is, the simple “rule of thumb”
principle, which reveals full information when there is enough competition and otherwise pools several
bidders to form competition, is approximately optimal. As an instantiation of this principle, Algorithm 1
pools the tail states consisting of a single high-valuation bidder to form competition among two bidders.
We make this choice because such a pooling scheme exists under only a minor assumption on λ, i.e., tail
balance (see Lemma 4.3). Nevertheless, from a practical perspective, if there exist pooling schemes that can
form competition among more bidders by pooling the states consisting of a few high-valuation bidders, we
suspect that the analogy of Algorithm 1 may yield more revenue in practice.
5 Private Signaling in the Known-Valuation Setting
In this section, we consider the design of the optimal private signaling scheme in the known-valuation
setting. To see the advantage of using private schemes, we first exhibit an example showing that private
signaling schemes may achieve arbitrarily better revenue than the optimal public signaling scheme.
Example 5.1. Consider a second-price auction with 3 bidders in the known-valuation setting. There are
two value profiles, as listed in the following table with corresponding probabilities.
bidder 1 bidder 2 bidder 3
prob: 1− ǫ 2ǫ ǫ 1
prob: ǫ 1 1− ǫ ǫ
Proposition 5.2. Assume any bidder bids her expected value when this is the dominant strategy. In Example
5.1, there exists a private signaling scheme that achieves arbitrarily better revenue, even in the worst Bayes
Nash equilibrium, than the optimal public signaling scheme.
Proposition 5.2 follows from Claim 5.3 and Claim 5.4. An intuitive explanation is as follows. In Exam-
ple 5.1, bidder 1 values the item more than bidder 2 at both states. We say bidder 1 is stronger than bidder
2. We consider a private signaling scheme that simply reveals full information to bidder 2 and 3 but no
information to bidder 1. This results in bidder 1, whose expected valuation is less than 3ǫ, to aggressively
bid at least 1− ǫ in order to win bidder 2. This greatly increases the revenue compared to the case of public
signaling schemes in which case bidders bid only their expected values.
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Claim 5.3. The revenue obtained by the optimal public signaling scheme in Example 5.1 is at most 3ǫ.
Claim 5.4. In Example 5.1, there exists a private signaling scheme that achieves revenue at least 1− ǫ even
in the worst Bayes Nash equilibrium.
Remark 5.5. Our earlier Example 2.2 shows that a weak bidder may bid as low as possible if less informed,
due to the winner’s curse. Example 5.1 illustrates an interesting “dual” phenomenon: a strong bidder may
bid very aggressively at equilibrium if less informed.
Discussion of the Bidding Behavior Assumption. To obtain any non-trivial revenue guarantee in our worst
case analysis, i.e., the worst Bayes Nash Equilibrium (BNE), it is necessary to make some bidder behavior
assumptions. Otherwise, the auctioneer’s revenue in the worst BNE of a second-price auction would always
be 0 regardless of what signaling scheme she uses since that one bidder bids arbitrarily large and all other
bidders bid 0 is always a BNE. To rule out these trivial equilibria, we assume throughout this section that
any bidder will bid his true value if this is the dominant strategy (also assumed in Proposition 5.2, Claim 5.3
and 5.4). Typically, the dominant strategy equilibrium is the most ideal solution concept to adopt for revenue
analysis. Unfortunately, it does not necessarily exist in second price auctions under private signaling. Our
assumption can be viewed as a natural generalization of the dominant strategy equilibrium to the setting
where it does not exist – i.e., bidders who have a dominant strategy will choose the dominant strategy and
on top of that, we take the worst case analysis.
Proposition 5.2 shows the appealing revenue property of private signaling schemes, which motivates
the computational question of designing the optimal private signaling scheme. Unfortunately, this turns
out to be challenging due to several technical barriers. The first is the problem of equilibrium selection.
Recall that there are usually many equilibria under private signaling schemes, as illustrated in Example 2.2.
Since there are no natural equilibrium selection criteria, we choose to analyze the revenue in the worst-
case equilibrium, as indicated in Proposition 5.2 (under the aforementioned bidding behavior assumption).
Second, as illustrated by Example 2.2 and 5.1, private signaling schemes usually cause complicated bidding
behaviors at equilibrium in second-price auctions. Even computing a desired equilibrium is already highly
non-trivial [17, 26], let alone optimizing the revenue over these equilibria.
Nevertheless, our next result shows that, under mild assumptions, there exists a private signaling scheme
that extracts almost the full surplus even in the worst Bayes Nash equilibrium. Before stating the result
formally, we first specify some notations. Let ρ∗ = maxθ,i vi(θ) denote the maximum value among all
possible valuations of all bidders, and i∗ denotes the bidder who has value ρ∗ (one of them if multiple). Let
ρ∗∗ = maxθ, i 6=i∗ vi(θ) be the maximum value among all possible valuations, excluding the values of bidder
i∗, and i∗∗ denote a bidder who has the value ρ∗∗. Let x+ = max(x, 0). We prove the following theorem.
Theorem 5.6. Assume 0 ∈ Vi for each i and λ supports on the entire set V . There exists a private signaling
scheme that can be implemented in poly(n,
∑
i |Vi|) time and extract the full surplus, excluding an amount
of
∑
θ λθ[vi∗(θ)− ρ∗∗]+ + ǫ for an arbitrarily small ǫ, even in the worst Bayes Nash equilibrium.
The intuition underlying the missed amount from the surplus in Theorem 5.6 is as follows. Recall that
ρ∗∗ is the largest possible value, excluding the values of bidder i∗. When i∗ has a value vi∗(θ) > ρ∗∗ at state
of nature θ, the revenue is at most ρ∗∗ in a second price auction since ρ∗∗ is the highest possible bid among
all bidders other than i∗. Therefore, an amount of [vi∗(θ) − ρ∗∗] can not be extracted from the surplus at
such a state. The excluded amount in Theorem 5.6, up to the negligible ǫ, is precisely the sum of all such
possible surplus losses weighted by their probabilities. In Example 5.1, ρ∗ = ρ∗∗ = 1, therefore the event
vi∗(θ) > ρ
∗ does not happen and the excluded amount equals to ǫ, which is indeed the gap between the total
surplus and the revenue of our constructed private signaling scheme (Claim 5.4).
The proof of Theorem 5.6 is inspired by Example 5.1, which can be viewed differently from the fol-
lowing perspective. In particular, the second value profile (1, 1 − ǫ, ǫ) in Example 5.1 can be viewed as
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an auxiliary value profile, which may have arbitrarily small probability but helps the auctioneer to extract
almost full surplus from the first value profile (2ǫ, ǫ, 1). To prove Theorem 5.6, we first generalize Example
5.1 by characterizing a general condition of two value profiles, under which an auxiliary value profile can be
leveraged to extract (almost) full surplus from another value profile. We then show that for any realized value
profile, a corresponding auxiliary value profile can always be constructed under the theorem assumptions.
We defer the formal proof to Appendix D.2.
6 Conclusions and Future Work
In this paper, we study optimal signaling in second price auctions when there is a large set of possible item
realizations. In a well-motivated Bayesian valuation setting, we obtain preliminary positive and negative
results for the optimal public signaling. We also initiate the study of optimal private signaling in auctions
and illustrate various challenges of designing the optimal private signaling scheme due to complicated equi-
librium bidding behaviors and equilibrium selection issues. In the basic known-valuation setting, we exhibit
a private signaling scheme that extracts almost the full surplus.
Our work has left open a rich set of interesting questions. We conclude by mentioning a few. In the
Bayesian valuation setting, we proved a menu-size-complexity-type negative result. However, the computa-
tional complexity of the problem is still open. In particular, is there a polynomial-time algorithm for optimal
public signaling in the Bayesian valuation setting? Our positive result here relies on the MHR assumption of
bidders’ valuation distributions. Is it possible to relax this assumption and obtain an approximately optimal
public scheme for more general settings? Is there still a “simple” approximate scheme in the more general
setting?
Our result for private signaling is still limited to the (less realistic) known valuation setting, but it il-
lustrates the surprising power of private schemes in extracting revenue. This opens many possibilities for
future research. We wonder whether similar results hold in more realistic auction settings, e.g., the Bayesian
valuation setting studied in this work. In particular, to what extent can private signaling schemes outper-
form public schemes in terms of extracting revenue? Is the auctioneer’s revenue from the optimal private
scheme close to the total surplus? How to efficiently compute the optimal private signaling scheme? These
descriptive and prescriptive questions are largely open in more realistic auction settings.
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A Proof of Theorem 3.1
We start by exhibiting the linear program used by the algorithm, which uses the empirical distribution λ˜ and
relaxes the first two constraints of LP (1) by ǫ
2n2
.
maximize
∑
σij∈Σ
∑
θ∈Θ˜ λ˜θϕ(θ, σ
ij)vj(θ)
subject to
∑
θ∈Θ˜ λ˜θϕ(θ, σ
ij)vi(θ) ≥
∑
θ∈Θ˜ λ˜θϕ(θ, σ
ij)vj(θ)− ǫ2n2 , for j 6= i.∑
θ∈Θ˜ λ˜θϕ(θ, σ
ij)vj(θ) ≥
∑
θ∈Θ˜ λ˜θϕ(θ, σ
ij)vk(θ)− ǫ2n2 , for k 6= i, j; j 6= i.∑
σij ϕ(θ, σ
ij) = 1, for θ ∈ Θ˜.
ϕ(θ, σij) ≥ 0, for θ ∈ Θ˜, σij ∈ Σ.
(3)
Figure 1: Relaxed Linear Program using Empirical Distributions
The algorithm simply solves Linear Program (3) and signals for θ as suggested by the solution of LP
(3). Details are in Algorithm 2, which we instantiate with ǫ > 0 and K = 8n
4
ǫ2
log 4n
3
ǫ . It is important to
notice that the signal σij generated by Algorithm 2 does not necessarily correspond to the outcome where
bidder i and j have the highest and second-highest values. This is because we have relaxed the constraints
in LP (3) so that i, j are not necessarily the top two bidders. Consequently, the objective of LP (3) does
not correspond to the revenue of the auction. Nevertheless, Lemma A.1 shows that the revenue is close
to the expected optimal objective value of LP (3), denoted as OPT (LP3). Theorem 3.1 follows from the
following two lemmas.
Algorithm 2 Public Signaling Scheme for Known-Valuation Setting
Parameter: ǫ ≥ 0; Integer K ≥ 0.
Input: State of nature θ represented by v(θ)
Input: Prior distribution λ given as a sampling oracle
Output: Signal σ ∈ Σ, where Σ = {σij}
i 6=j∈[n].
1: Draw integer ℓ uniformly at random from {1, . . . ,K}, and denote θℓ = θ.
2: Sample θ1, . . . , θℓ−1, θℓ+1 . . . , θK independently from the state of nature, and let λ˜ denote the empirical
distribution over the multiset Θ˜ = {θ1, . . . , θK}.
3: Solve linear program (3). Let ϕ˜ : Θ˜→ ∆(Σ) be the optimal solution.
4: Output signal σij with probability ϕ˜(θℓ, σ
ij).
Lemma A.1. Assume θ ∼ λ, and assume bidders bid their conditional expected value upon receiving a
signal. The expected revenue is at least E
Θ˜
OPT (LP3)− ǫ2 . Both expectations are taken over the random
input θ as well as internal randomness and Monte-Carlo sampling performed by the algorithm.
Proof. Let Rev be the total expected revenue achieved by Algorithm 2, Rev(σij) denote the expected
revenue generated by signal σij , multiplied by the probability of receiving signal σij . Therefore, Rev =∑
σij∈Σ Rev(σ
ij). Let vk(σ
ij) denote the bidder k’s value on receiving signal σij , also multiplied by the
probability of receiving signal σij . Further, we denote vk(σ
ij |Θ˜) = ∑θ∈Θ˜ λ˜θϕ(θ, σij)vk(θ). Therefore,
vk(σ
ij) = E
Θ˜
[
vk(σ
ij |Θ˜)]. Note that, by the principle of deferred decision, Θ˜ = {θ1, ..., θK} at Step 2 can
be viewed asK i.i.d. samples from λ.
The first two constraints of LP (3) mean vi(σ
ij |Θ˜) ≥ vj(σij |Θ˜)− ǫ2n2 and vj(σij |Θ˜) ≥ vk(σij |Θ˜)− ǫ2n2
14
for all k 6= i, j. Taking expectation over Θ on both sides of the inequalities, we have
vi(σ
ij) = E
Θ˜
[
vi(σ
ij |Θ˜)] ≥ E
Θ˜
[
vj(σ
ij |Θ˜)− ǫ
2n2
]
= vj(σ
ij)− ǫ
2n2
. (4)
Similarly, vj(σ
ij) ≥ vk(σij) − ǫ2n2 for all k 6= i, j. Since the revenue of a second-price auction is at least
the minimum of any two bidders’ values, we have
Rev(σij) ≥ min
(
vi(σ
ij), vj(σ
ij)
)
≥ vj(σij)− ǫ
2n2
, (5)
where the last inequality follows from Inequality (4). Therefore,
Rev =
∑
σij∈Σ
Rev(σij)
≥
∑
σij∈Σ
[
vj(σ
ij)− ǫ
2n2
]
=
∑
σij∈Σ
E
Θ˜
[
vj(σ
ij |Θ˜)]− ǫ
2
= E
Θ˜
[ ∑
σij∈Σ
∑
θ∈Θ˜
λ˜θϕ(θ, σ
ij)vj(θ)
]
− ǫ
2
= E
Θ˜
OPT (LP3)− ǫ
2
Lemma A.2. Let OPT denote the expected revenue induced by the optimal signaling scheme for prior
distribution λ. When Algorithm 2 is instantiated with K = 8n
4
ǫ2
log 4n
3
ǫ and its input θ is drawn from λ, the
expected revenue generated by Algorithm 2 is at least OPT − ǫ. Expectation is over the random input θ as
well as the Monte-Carlo sampling performed by the algorithm.
Proof. We prove that whenK = 8n
4
ǫ2
log 4n
3
ǫ , with probability at least 1− ǫ4 , the expected optimal objective
of LP (3) is at least OPT − ǫ2 . This, together with Lemma A.1, implies that the revenue generated by
Algorithm 2 is at least OPT − ǫ.
Let ϕ∗ be the solution of LP (1), i.e., precisely the optimal signaling scheme of the problem. At a
high level, we will show that restricting ϕ∗ to the set Θ˜ results in a scheme that is feasible for LP (3) and
achieves revenue at least OPT (LP3) − ǫ/2 with high probability. Formally, let ϕ˜(θ, σ) = ϕ∗(θ, σ) for
any θ ∈ Θ˜, σ ∈ Σ, and λ˜ be the empirical distribution over Θ˜. Observe that fixing any i, j, both the
left-hand-side and right-hand-side terms in the first and second constraints of LP (1) can be viewed as the
expectation of random variable ϕ∗(θ, σij) over random θ ∼ λ, while the corresponding constraints in LP
(3) with constructed solution ϕ˜ are precisely their empirical means over K samples. By the principle of
deferred decision, these samples can be viewed as i.i.d. samples from θ ∼ λ. Therefore, with probability
at least 1 − e−2( ǫ4n2 )2K > 1 − ǫ4n3 , the empirical mean of any term is within ǫ4n2 of its expectation. Since
there are n different terms in total for any given σij and |Σ| = n(n − 1), by union bound, with probability
at least 1− ǫ/4, all the empirical means are within ǫ4n2 of their expectations. In this case, since the original
expectations satisfy the first two constraints of LP (1), the empirical means staisfy the first (relaxed) two
constraints of LP (3), implying that ϕ˜ is feasible to LP (3). Moreover, the objective value of ϕ˜ in LP (3) is
within ǫ
4n2
·n(n−1) ≤ ǫ/4 of the optimal objective value of LP (1), i.e., OPT . Therefore, we have found a
feasible ϕ˜ for LP (3) that achieves objective at least OPT − ǫ4 with probability at least 1− ǫ4 . Randomness
is over the samples Θ˜. This implies that EΘ˜
[
OPT (LP3)
] ≥ OPT − ǫ2 , proving the lemma.
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B Proof of Theorem 4.1
We construct a problem in which any scheme with 2o(n
1/4) signals must be far from optimality. In fact, the
problem we will construct is almost the simplest instance in the Bayesian valuation setting. In particular,
consider a second-price auction in the Bayesian-valuation setting with n i.i.d. bidders, described as follows.
Any bidder i has a valuation function V , which depends on her private type ti ∈ {A,B} and a binary item
type θi ∈ {0, 1}. Every bidder has the same valuation function V (ti, θi), whose value table is as follows:
V (·, 0) V (·, 1)
A 0 1
B 0 0
θi’s are i.i.d. with Pr(θi = 1) = ǫ for some small constant ǫ. Therefore, the prior distribution of θ is a
product distribution with Pr(θ) = ǫ|θ|(1 − ǫ)n−|θ|. Moreover, bidders’ private type ti’s are also i.i.d. with
Pr(ti = A) =
1√
n
for each i.
For convenience, we will use D0 to denote the point distribution at 0 and D1 to denote the binary
distribution which takes value 1 with probability 1√
n
. Observe that in the constructed instance above, θi = 0
or 1 specifies bidder i’s valuation distribution is D0 or D1. We start by showing that the revenue of the
optimal public signaling scheme, denoted as OPTr, is lower bounded by a value arbitrarily close to 1 for
large enough n.
Lemma B.1. OPTr ≥ 1− e−ǫ
√
n − ǫ√n · e−ǫ
n−1√
n .
Proof. We consider the scheme of fully revealing θ to every bidder and show that the revenue of this particu-
lar public signaling scheme is already lower bounded by the RHS of the inequality in the lemma. Notice that
Pr(|θ| = i) = Cinǫ|θ|(1 − ǫ)n−|θ|. Moreover, when |θ| = i, there are i bidders who have value distribution
D1. It is not hard to check that the revenue in this case is 1− (1− 1√n)i− i√n(1− 1√n)(i−1). Therefore, the
revenue of full information scheme satisfies
Rev =
n∑
i=0
Cinǫ
i(1− ǫ)n−i ·
[
1− (1− 1√
n
)i − i√
n
(1− 1√
n
)(i−1)
]
= 1−
n∑
i=0
Cinǫ
i(1− ǫ)n−i · (1− 1√
n
)i −
n∑
i=0
Cinǫ
i(1− ǫ)n−i · i√
n
(1− 1√
n
)(i−1)
= 1− (1− ǫ+ ǫ− ǫ√
n
)n − ǫ√n n∑
i=0
Ci−1n−1(1− ǫ)n−i · ǫi−1(1−
1√
n
)(i−1)
= 1− (1− ǫ+ ǫ− ǫ√
n
)n − ǫ√n(1− ǫ+ ǫ− ǫ√
n
)n−1
≥ 1− e−ǫ
√
n − ǫ√n · e−
ǫ(n−1)√
n .
Therefore, OPTr ≥ Rev ≥ 1− e−ǫ
√
n − ǫ√n · e−
ǫ(n−1)√
n , as desired.
We will now upper bound the revenue of any signaling scheme that uses N signals, and show that
the revenue is small when N = 2o(n
1/4). Unfortunately, directly examining revenue is difficult. We instead
consider an obvious upper bound of revenue, i.e., the welfare, and instead upper bound the maximumwelfare
of any signaling scheme using N signals.
We say a signaling scheme is deterministic if it maps each state of nature deterministically to one signal.
As a result, each signal corresponds to a subset of states and all such subsets form a partition of the space
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of states of nature. A deterministic signaling scheme with N signals is denoted by {S1, ..., SN}, which is a
partition of {0, 1}n. We therefore also call Si a signal. The following lemma shows that there always exists
a deterministic signaling scheme that achieves the maximum welfare. Intuitively, this is because welfare is
a convex function (more precisely, the max function) of bidders’ valuations, thus achieves its optimal value
at a vertex of the polytope of signaling schemes.
Lemma B.2. [11] Let XN denote all possible public signaling schemes using at most N signals. There
always exists a deterministic signaling scheme that achieves the maximum welfare among schemes in XN .
Such a deterministic signaling scheme partitions the set {0, 1}n into at most N subsets.
As a result of Lemma B.2, it is without loss of generality to upper bound the welfare achieved by
deterministic signaling schemes, which are collections of subsets of {0, 1}n. For any S ⊆ {0, 1}n, we use
Pr(S) =
∑
θ∈S λθ to denote the probability mass of the subset. At a high level, our idea is to show that any
subset of {0, 1}n either results in a welfare ofO(ǫ) or has exponentially small probability mass (specifically,
Pr(S) ≤ 2−Θ(n1/4)). This will imply that a deterministic scheme with 2o(n1/4) signals (i.e., subsets) must
have O(ǫ) welfare.
For any S ⊆ {0, 1}n, let
θ(S) = E(θ|θ ∈ S) =
∑
θ∈S ǫ
|θ|(1− ǫ)n−|θ| · θ∑
θ∈S ǫ|θ|(1− ǫ)n−|θ|
denote the expectation of the states in S. When S is clear from the context, we simply use θ to denote the
expected state. Observe that θi is the probability that bidder i’s valuation function is D1 conditioned on
receiving the signal S. The following lemma shows that if θ(S) have many large components, then Pr(S)
should be small.
Lemma B.3. For any S ⊆ {0, 1}n, letm be the number of entries in θ(S) with values at least 2ǫ. Then we
have Pr(S) ≤ e−2
√
m.
Proof. By symmetry, w.l.o.g., we assume the firstm entries of θ are at least 2ǫ. We view this as a constrain
on the set S and will seek to maximize Pr(S) over all possible sets S subject to the constraint. This can be
abstractly formulated as an optimization problem.
maximize Pr(S) =
∑
θ∈S ǫ
|θ|(1− ǫ)n−|θ|
subject to S : values of firstm entries of θ(S) ≥ 2ǫ. (6)
Program for Maximizing Pr(S)
Unfortunately, Optimization Program (6) is difficult to reason about. We instead relax the constraint to
be that the firstm entries sum up to at least 2mǫ and the consider the relaxed program as follows.
maximize Pr(S) =
∑
θ∈S ǫ
|θ|(1− ǫ)n−|θ|
subject to Sum of firstm entries of θ ≥ 2mǫ. (7)
Relaxed Program for Maximizing Pr(S).
It turns out that the optimal solution to Optimization Program (7) can be explicitly constructed. In par-
ticular, the program seeks to maximize Pr(S) subject to that the sum of firstm entries have large expected
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values. Some thoughts reveal that the optimal solution are obtained as follows: add all the θ with first m
entries summing up to m, then add all the θ with first m entries summing up to m − 1, and so on so forth,
until that the expected sum of the firstm entries is less than 2mǫ. Let k denote the sum of the firstm entries
of the last element added to S. Obviously, k < 2mǫ. We now argue that k is at least ǫm + m3/4. This
requires a technical lemma which will be proved at the end of this section.
Lemma B.4. Let X1,X2, ...,Xm be m i.i.d. Bernoulli random variables with E(Xi) = ǫ for every i
and X =
∑m
i=1Xi. Let k = ǫm + m
3/4 and ǫ ∈ (0, 12), there exists N such that E(X|X ≥ k) =∑m
i=k C
i
mǫ
i(1−ǫ)m−i·i∑m
i=k C
i
mǫ
i(1−ǫ)m−i < 2mǫ for anym ≥ N . Here Cim = m!i!(m−i)! is the binomial coefficient.
Lemma B.4 shows that k is at least ǫm+m3/4, since otherwise the expected sum of the firstm entries
of θ(S) is less than 2mǫ, violating the constraint of Program 7. As a result, OPT (P7) is upper bounded
by P (k) =
∑m
i=k C
i
mǫ
i(1 − ǫ)m−i, which is the probability that sum of m i.i.d. binary random variables
is at least k. By the Hoeffding bound, we know that P (k) ≤ e−2
√
m when k ≥ ǫm + m3/4. Therefore,
OPT (P6) ≤ OPT (7) ≤ P (ǫm+m3/4) ≤ e−2
√
m, concluding the proof.
Utilizing Lemma B.3, we can now formally show that for any signal S ⊆ {0, 1}n , either the welfare
from S is O(ǫ) or its probability is exponentially small.
Lemma B.5. For any S ⊆ {0, 1}n , at least one of the following two holds:
1. The conditional welfare of signal S is at most 3ǫ.
2. Pr(S) ≤ e−2n1/4C where C =
√
ln 1−2ǫ1−3ǫ > 0 is a constant depending on ǫ.
Proof. Given θ, the (expected) value distribution for bidder i is θi with probability 1/
√
n and 0 otherwise.
Let m denote the number of entries of θ that are at least 2ǫ. By independence, the probability that at least
one bidder’s value is at least 2ǫ is 1 − (1 − 1√
n
)m. Therefore, the conditional welfare Wel(S) is upper
bounded 2ǫ · (1 − 1√
n
)m + 1 − (1 − 1√
n
)m. We show that if Wel(S) > 3ǫ, then m >
√
n · ln 1−2ǫ1−3ǫ , as
follows
Wel(S) > 3ǫ
⇒ 2ǫ · (1− 1√
n
)m + 1− (1− 1√
n
)m > 3ǫ
⇒ 1− 3ǫ > (1− 2ǫ) · (1− 1√
n
)m
⇒ ln 1− 3ǫ
1− 2ǫ > m ln(1−
1√
n
) ≥ m · (− 1√
n
)
⇒ m > √n · ln 1− 2ǫ
1− 3ǫ
Therefore, ifWel(S) > 3ǫ, we have by Lemma B.3 that
Pr(S) ≤ e−2
√
m ≤ e−2n1/4C
for C =
√
ln 1−2ǫ1−3ǫ .
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Finally, let S = {S1, ..., SN} be any deterministic signaling scheme with N signals. Utilizing Lemma
B.5, we have
Wel(S) =
∑
S:Wel(S)≤3ǫ
Wel(S) ·Pr(S) +
∑
S:Wel(S)>3ǫ
Wel(S) ·Pr(S)
≤
∑
S:Wel(S)≤3ǫ
3ǫ ·Pr(S) +
∑
S:Wel(S)>3ǫ
Wel(S) · e−2n1/4C
≤ 3ǫ+N · e−2n1/4C ,
where constant C =
√
ln 1−2ǫ1−3ǫ . For any N = 2
o(n1/4), 3ǫ+N · e−2n1/4C is upper bounded by 4ǫ for large
enough n. On the other hand, the revenue is close to 1. Since ǫ can be an arbitrarily small constant, any
signaling scheme with 2o(n
1/4) signals cannot guarantee a constant fraction of the optimal revenue for any
constant less than 1. This concludes our proof of Theorem 4.1.
Proof of the Technical Lemma B.4
(Note: we use p instead of ǫ as in the original lemma statement.)
Lemma Statement: Let X1,X2, ...,Xm be m i.i.d. Bernoulli random variables with E(Xi) = p for every
i and X =
∑m
i=1Xi. Let k = pm + m
3/4 and p ∈ (0, 12), there exists N such that E(X|X ≥ k) =∑m
i=k C
i
mp
i(1−p)m−i·i∑m
i=k C
i
mp
i(1−p)m−i < 2mp for anym ≥ N , where Cim is the binomial coefficient.
For convenience, we define the following terms:
C(m,k; p) = Pr(X = k) = Ckmp
k(1− p)m−k.
S(m,k; p) = Pr(X ≥ k) =
m∑
i=k
Cimp
i(1− p)m−i
E(m,k; p) = E(X|X ≥ k) ·Pr(X ≥ k) =
m∑
i=k
Cimp
i(1− p)m−i · i
Lemma B.6. Fix p, there exists large enough N such that for any integer m ≥ N and k ∈ [pm, pm +
m3/4 + 1], we have
S(m,k + 1; p) > C(m,k; p).
Proof. We first upper bound the ratio between C(m,k+1; p) and C(m,k; p) for k ∈ [pm, pm+m3/4+3].
rk =
C(m,k + 1; p)
C(m,k; p)
=
Ck+1m p
k+1(1− p)m−k−1
Ckmp
k(1− p)m−k
=
m− k
k + 1
· p
1− p
≥ m− pm−m
3/4 − 3
pm+m3/4 + 4
· p
1− p
Note that m−pm−m
3/4−3
pm+m3/4+4
≤ m−pmpm = 1−pp , and tends to 1−pp as m → ∞. Therefore, there exists large
enough N such that n−pm−m
3/4−3
pm+m3/4+4
≥ 34 · 1−pp , thus rk ≥ 34 , for any m ≥ N . Therefore, for any k ∈
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[pm, pm+m3/4 + 1].
S(m,k + 1; p) > C(m,k + 1; p) + C(m,k + 2; p)
= rkC(m,k; p) + rkrk+1C(m,k; p)
≥
[
3
4
+ (
3
4
)2
]
· C(m,k; p)
≥ C(m,k; p).
This shows that S(m,k + 1; p) > C(m,k; p) for anym ≥ N , as desired.
Proof of the Lemma:
Note that E(X|X ≥ k) = E(m,k;p)S(m,k;p) . Let ∆(m,k; p) = E(m,k; p) − 2pmS(m,k; p). We prove that
∆(m,k; p) < 0.
∆(m,k; p)
m
=
1
m
m∑
i=k
i · Cimpi(1− p)m−i − 2p ·
m∑
i=k
Cimp
i(1− p)m−i
=
m∑
i=k
Ci−1m−1p
i(1− p)m−i − 2p ·
m∑
i=k
[
Ci−1m−1 + C
i
m−1
]
pi(1− p)m−i
= (1− 2p) ·
m∑
i=k
Ci−1m−1p
i(1− p)m−i − 2p ·
m∑
i=k
Cim−1p
i(1− p)m−i
= (1− 2p) ·
m−1∑
i=k−1
Cim−1p
i+1(1− p)m−i−1 − 2p ·
m−1∑
i=k
Cim−1p
i(1− p)m−i
= (1− 2p)p ·
m−1∑
i=k−1
Cim−1p
i(1− p)m−1−i − 2p(1− p) ·
m−1∑
i=k
Cim−1p
i(1− p)m−1−i
= (1− 2p)p ·
[
S(m− 1, k; p) + C(m− 1, k − 1; p)
]
− 2p(1− p) · S(m− 1, k; p)
Note thatm3/4 < (m− 1)3/4+1 for anym > 1, therefor k− 1 = pm− 1+m3/4 < p(m− 1)+ (m−
1)3/4+1. It is easy to see that k−1 > p(m−1). As a result, k−1 ∈ [p(m−1), p(m−1)+(m−1)3/4+1].
By Lemma B.6, there exists N such that S(m− 1, k; p) > C(m− 1, k− 1; p) for anym ≥ N . In this case,
we have
∆(m,k; p)
m
< S(m− 1, k; p)
[
(1− 2p)2p − 2p(1− p)
]
≤ 0.
Therefore, ∆(m,k : p) < 0 for anym ≥ N .
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C Omitted Proofs from Section 4
C.1 Proof of Lemma 4.3
Since any θ ∈ Θ1 can be viewed as a bidder i, we will think ofΘ1 as [n] and a bidder i as a state inΘ1 = [n].
Let pi denote the probability of state i. W.l.o.g., assume that p1 ≥ p2... ≥ pn. We now prove each direction.
“⇒”: Since p1 · π(1, i) = pi · π(i, 1) for any i = 1, ...n (note π(1, 1) = 0), summing over i, we obtain
p1 =
n∑
i=1
p1 · π(1, i) =
n∑
i=1
pi · π(i, 1) =
n∑
i=2
pi · π(i, 1) ≤
n∑
i=2
pi.
Since p1 ≥ pj for any j, we have pj ≤
∑
i 6=j pi, as desired.
“⇐”: We show that a pooling scheme can be explicitly constructed. Observe that the pooling scheme
can be viewed as matching bidders with equal probability mass. Particularly, bidder i and j are matched
with probability mass λiπ(i, j). We first show that if p1 = p2, there always exists a feasible pooling scheme.
This is because we can match bidder n with n−1 for probability mass of pn so that the left probability mass
of bidder n − 1 is p′n−1 = pn−1 − pn while bidder n has 0 probability mass left. We then match bidder
n − 1 with bidder n − 2 for probability mass p′n−1, etc. This process will continue until only bidder 1, 2, 3
have non-zero probability masses left, satisfying p1 = p2 ≥ p′3. Finally, we can match bidder 1 with bidder
3 for probability mass p′3/2, bidder 2 with bidder 3 for probability mass p
′
3/2, and bidder 1 with bidder 2
for probability mass p1 − p′3/2, yielding a feasible pooling scheme.
When p1 > p2, we can reduce it to the case with p1 = p2, as follows. We take probability mass of
p1 − p2 from bidder 1, and use it to match bidder 1 with all other bidders except bidder 2, i.e., match bidder
1 with bidder 3, bidder 4, ..., bidder n. Since p1 ≤
∑n
i=2 pi, i.e., p1−p2 ≤
∑n
i=3 pi, the probability mass of
p1 − p2 from bidder 1 will be used up to match bidder 1 with other bidders except bidder 2, at which point
we arrive at an instance satisfying p1 = p2. A pooling scheme for the left probability masses can then be
constructed using the earlier procedure.
C.2 Proof of Theorem 4.4 and Lemma 4.5
Recall that the welfare is maximized by revealing full information, and the optimal welfare is the expectation
of the welfare at each state of nature. Our proof will lower bound the revenue in terms of the optimal welfare.
In fact, we will prove an even stronger result: given any realized state of nature, the revenue generated at
that state is at least 1/8 fraction of the welfare at that state. We prove separately for the states that are fully
revealed and these that are pooled.
Our analysis involves various comparisons of welfare and revenue in the standard second price auction
(with no signaling). The main technical barrier comes from the fact that bidders are asymmetric in the sense
that they have either the high or low distribution at any given state of nature. This makes it difficult to
analytically characterize revenue and welfare. Our strategy is to first analyze the symmetric case in which
all bidders have the same value distribution H(v), and then extend the bound to asymmetric bidders. We
use Ak to denote a standard second price auction with k i.i.d. bidders, and Rev(Ak;H) and Wel(Ak;H)
denote the revenue and welfare respectively when bidders in Ak have value distribution H(v). Let An,k
denote a standard second price auction with n independent bidders, among whom k bidders have value high
distribution H(v) and another n− k bidders have low value distribution L(v). Rev(An,k) and Wel(An,k)
denote the revenue and welfare of the auction An,k, respectively. The notation v[1] and v[2] are reserved for
the largest and second largest bidder value in the auction.
In auction Ak with distribution H(v), Pr(v[1] ≤ v) = Hk(v) and Pr(v[2] ≤ v) = kHk−1(v) − (k −
1)Hk(v). The welfare and revenue is the expectation of v[1] and v[2] respectively, which can be expressed
as follows. Here, we use constant Ck = 1 +
1
2 + ...
1
k denote the harmonic number.
21
Wel(Ak;H)
=
∫ ∞
0
[1−Hk(v)]dv
=
∫ ∞
0
1−H(v)
h(v)
[
1 +H(v)... +Hk−1(v)
]
h(v)dv
=
1−H(v)]
h(v)
[
H(v) +
H2(v)
2
...+
Hk(v)
k
]∣∣∣∣∞
0
−
∫ ∞
0
(
1−H(v)]
h(v)
)′[
H(v) +
H2(v)
2
...+
Hk(v)
k
]
dv
= lim
v→∞
1−H(v)
h(v)
· Ck +
∫ ∞
0
(
− 1−H(v)]
h(v)
)′[
H(v) +
H2(v)
2
...+
Hk(v)
k
]
dv
and
Rev(Ak;H)
=
∫ ∞
0
[1− kHk−1(v) + (k − 1)Hk(v)]dv
=
∫ ∞
0
1−H(v)
h(v)
[
1 +H(v)... +Hk−2(v)− (k − 1)Hk−1(v)
]
h(v)dv
= lim
v→∞
1−H(v)
h(v)
· (Ck − 1) +
∫ ∞
0
(
− 1−H(v)]
h(v)
)′[
H(v) +
H2(v)
2
...+
Hk−1(v)
k − 1 −
(k − 1)Hk(v)
k
]
dv
The last equality in both expressions comes from integration by parts. For convenience, let x = H(v) ∈
[0, 1]. The term in the square bracket of Rev(Ak;H) is denoted as Rk(x) = x + x
2/2 + ..., xk/k − xk,
while the term in the square bracket of Wel(Ak;H) is denoted as Wk(x) = x + x
2/2 + ..., xk/k. The
following lemma is central to our analysis.
Lemma C.1. For any integer k, i > 0, if there exists ρ > 0 such that Rk(x) ≥ ρ ·Wi(x) for all x ∈ [0, 1],
then Rev(Ak;H) ≥ ρ ·Wel(Ai;H).
Proof. Notice that
1−H(v)
h(v) ≥ 0 by definition, and
(
− 1−H(v)]h(v)
)′
≥ 0 by the MHR assumption. Comparing
the terms in Rev(Ak;H) and Wel(Ai;H), it is not hard to conclude that the assumed conditions are
sufficient to guarantee Rev(Ak;H) ≥ ρ ·Wel(Ai;H) (note that Ck − 1 = Rk(1) and Ck = Wk(1)).
Using Lemma C.1, we now prove that when |θ|1 ≥ 2 or |θ|1 = 0, in which case we fully reveal θ and
then run a standard second price auction, the revenue is at least 18 fraction of welfare.
Lemma C.2. Rev(Ak;H) ≥ max{13 , ln(k+1)−1ln(k+1) } ·Wel(Ak;H) for any k ≥ 2.
Proof. It is easy to check
f(x) =
Rk(x)
Wk(x)
= 1− x
k
x+ x2/2 + ...xk/k
is a decreasing function for x ∈ [0, 1], therefore, we have
f(x) ≥ f(1) = Ck − 1
Ck
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That is, Rk(x) ≥ Ck−1Ck Wk(x). Invoking Lemma C.1, we have
Rev(Ak;H)
Wel(Ak;H)
≥ Ck − 1
Ck
≥ 1
3
where we used the inequality Ck = 1 +
1
2 ... +
1
k ≥ 3/2 when k ≥ 2 and x−1x is increasing in x. Similarly,
Rev(Ak;H) ≥ ln(k+1)−1ln(k+1) Wel(Ak;H) since Ck ≥ ln(k + 1). This proves the lemma.
Lemma C.2 implies that when |θ| = 0, in which case we reveal full information, the revenue is at least
max{13 , ln(k+1)−1ln(k+1) } fraction of the welfare (Part 1 of Lemma 4.5). We now prove similar guarantee for the
case |θ| ≥ 2. This is proven by extending the above bound to the case with asymmetric bidders.
Lemma C.3. [Part 2 of Lemma 4.5] For k ≥ 2, Rev(An,k) ≥ max{16 , ln(k+1)−12 ln(k+1) } ·Wel(An,k).
Proof. Let m = n − k denote the number of low-distribution bidders, u ∈ Rk,v ∈ Rm denote the value
profile of the high-distribution bidders and low-distribution bidders respectively. Notice that max(u,v) ≤
max(u) + max(v) for any u ∈ Rk,v ∈ Rm, we therefore have
Wel(An,k) = E
u∼Hk
E
v∼Lm
max(u,v)
≤ E
u∼Hk
E
v∼Lm
[max(u) + max(v)]
= Wel(Ak;H) +Wel(Am;L)
We now lower bound Rev(An,k) in terms of Wel(An,k). Since the auction consists of k high-distribution
bidders andm low-distribution bidders, we haveRev(An,k) ≥ Rev(Ak;H) andRev(An,k) ≥ Rev(Am;L).
When k ≤ m, we have
Rev(An,k) ≥ 1
2
(
Rev(Am;L) +Rev(Ak;H)
)
≥ 1
2
[max{1
3
,
ln(m+ 1)− 1
ln(m+ 1)
} ·Wel(Am;L) + max{1
3
,
ln(k + 1)− 1
ln(k + 1)
} ·Wel(Ak;H)]
≥ max{1
6
,
ln(k + 1)− 1
2 ln(k + 1)
}Wel(An,k).
where the second inequality follows from Lemma C.2.
When k > m or equivalently k > 12n, we apply LemmaC.1 to getRev(Ak;H) ≥ max{16 , ln(k+1)−12 ln(k+1) }Wel(An;H).
To do so, we lower bound the following function:
f(x) =
Rk(x)
Wn(x)
=
x+ x2/2 + · · ·+ xk/k − xk
x+ x2/2 + · · ·+ xn/n
= 1−
n∑
i=k+1
xi/i
x+ x2/2 + · · ·+ xn/n −
xk
x+ x2/2 + · · ·+ xn/n
≥ 1−
n∑
i=k+1
xi/i
x+ x2/2 + · · ·+ xi/i −
xk
x+ x2/2 + · · · + xk/k
≥ 1−
n∑
i=k+1
1
i · Ci −
1
Ck
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where the last inequality uses the fact that x
i
x+x2/2+···+xi/i achieves maximum at x = 1. As a result, f(x)
can be further lower bounded as follows:
f(x) ≥ 1− 1
Ck
·
(
1 +
n∑
i=k+1
1
i
)
≥ 1− 1 + ln(n − 1) − ln(k)
ln(k + 1)
≥ max{1
6
,
ln(k + 1)− 1
2 ln(k + 1)
},
where the second inequality is due to the fact
∑n
i=k+1
1
i ≤ ln(n− 1)− ln(k) and the last inequality is easy
to verify to be true for any k ≥ 12 (since n ≥ 22 by assumption of Theorem 4.4).
As a result, when k ≥ m, we have
Rev(An,k) ≥ max{1
6
,
ln(k + 1)− 1
2 ln(k + 1)
}Wel(An,H) ≥ max{1
6
,
ln(k + 1)− 1
2 ln(k + 1)
}Wel(An,k).
So far we have shown that at the states that are fully revealed, the revenue is at least 16 fraction of the
welfare. We now prove similar guarantees for the states that are pooled. Note that when Algorithm 1 outputs
a pool signal (θ′, pool) where θ′ ∈ Θ2, the two bidders i, j ∈ θ′ are equally likely (by definition of the 1-tail
balanced pooling scheme), therefore each bidder in θ′ has a high distribution with probability 1/2. Assume
bidders bid in expectation, the revenue in this case is at least 12 ·Rev(An,2). The following lemma shows
that 12 Rev(An,2) ≥ 18 Wel(An,1). This implies that in Algorithm 1, the revenue at any pooled state is at
least 18 fraction of the welfare of that state.
Lemma C.4. [Part 3 of Lemma 4.5] When n ≥ 22, we have 12 ·Rev(An,2) ≥ 18 ·Wel(An,1).
Proof. We first prove Rev(A2;H) ≥ 12 Wel(A1;H). This is because C2 − 1 = 12 = 12C1 and R2(x)W1(x) =
x−x2
2
x ≥ 12 for any x ∈ [0, 1]. Invoking Lemma C.1, we obtain the conclusion.
Now we argue that when n ≥ 22,Rev(An−2;H) ≥ 12 Wel(An−1;H). Note that Cn−1 ≤ 2[Cn−2− 1]
for any n ≥ 22. By Lemma C.1, we only need to prove Wn−1(x) ≤ 2Rn−2(x) for any x ∈ [0, 1] and
n ≥ 22, as follows:
Rn−2(x)
Wn−1(x)
=
x+ x/2 + ..., xn−2/(n− 2)− xn−2
x+ x/2 + ..., xn−1/(n− 1)
= 1− x
n−1/(n − 1) + xn−2
x+ x/2 + ..., xn−1/(n − 1)
≥ 1− (
1
n−1 + 1)x
n−2
x+ x/2 + ..., xn−2/(n − 2)
≥ Cn−2 − 1−
1
n−1
Cn−2
≥ 1
2
Similar to the proof in LemmaC.3, we haveWel(An,1) ≤Wel(A1;H)+Wel(An−1;L) andRev(An,2) ≥
1
2(Rev(A2;H) +Rev(An−2;L)). Therefore
Rev(An,2) ≥ 1
2
· [1
2
Wel(A1;H) +
1
2
Wel(An−1;L)] ≥ 1
4
Wel(An,1).
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D Omitted Proofs from Section 5
D.1 Proof of Claim 5.3 and Claim 5.4
Proof of Claim 5.3. Note that in public signaling schemes, bidders always bid their expected values by our
behavior assumption. In Example 5.1, bidder 1’s valuation is higher than bidder 2’s at any state, therefore
bidder 1’s bid is always greater than bidder 2’s, conditioned on any signal. This implies that bidder 1’s bid
is either the highest or the second highest given any signal. As a result, the revenue is at most bidder 1’s bid,
which in expectation is less than 3ǫ.
Proof of Claim 5.4. Consider the following private signaling scheme: the auctioneer informs bidder 2 and
3 the true state but reveals no information to bidder 1. Since bidder 2 and 3 know the exact state, bidding
the true value is their dominant strategy. We claim that the equilibrium bid of bidder 1 lies in the interval
[1− ǫ, 1). To see this, observe that any bid less than 1− ǫ does not place bidder 1 in the winning position in
neither state, thus results in expected utility 0 to bidder 1. However, any bid b ∈ (1− ǫ, 1) helps bidder 1 to
win the auction at the second state, which results in a strictly positive utility for bidder 1. Therefore, bidder
1 bids at least 1 − ǫ in any equilibrium, and the auctioneer’s revenue is also at least 1 − ǫ, concluding the
proof.
D.2 Proof of Theorem 5.6
Example 5.1 illustrates a situation in which the auctioneer can use a private signaling scheme to extract
revenue of at least 1 − ǫ, which is close to the total surplus 1. Interestingly, this example can be thought
differently from the perspective of signaling schemes. In particular, imagine we are given any realized value
profile (2ǫ, ǫ, 1)T , Example 5.1 and Claim 5.4 show that by “mixing” this value profile with another value
profile (1, 1− ǫ, ǫ)T of arbitrarily small probability, we can extract almost full surplus from the given value
profile (2ǫ, ǫ, 1)T using private signaling schemes. If we can do such mixing for any realized value profile,
the aggregated revenue should be close to the full surplus. It turns out that this insight can be made precise.
We start by generalizing Example 5.1 and characterizing the structure of value profiles that leads to high
revenue. Throughout the proof, we will use ui to denote the i’th entry of any vector u and u[i] to denote the
i’th largest entry of u. The following lemma plays a key role in our poof.
Lemma D.1. Consider a second-price auction in the known-valuation setting with two possible value pro-
files v, u ∈ Rn that have the following structure:
Probability
v : prob. (1− δ) u : prob. δ
... ... ...
bidder j ... u[1] (> u[2])
... ... ...
bidder k ... u[2] (= v[1] − ǫ)
... ... ...
bidder i v[1] ...
... ... ...
If j 6= i (but k could equal i) and v[1], u[1], u[2] satisfy the conditions in the above table , then for any
δ > 0, the following private signaling scheme extracts revenue at least (v[1] − ǫ) even in the worst Bayes
Nash equilibrium: reveal no information to bidder j and reveal full information to every other bidder.
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The proof of Lemma D.1 follows a similar argument as that of Claim 5.4, thus omitted here. It is
important to notice that Lemma D.1 does not depend on the probability δ so long as it is strictly positive.
Therefore, given any realized value profile v, if we can mix it with a value profile u of arbitrarily small
probability that satisfied the properties in Lemma D.1, then the corresponding private scheme will force
bidder j – the bidder with highest value in value profile u – to bid at least u[2] = v[1] − ǫ. Such a bid will
help the auctioneer leverage almost full surplus from v.
For convenience, we will call u the auxiliary vector of v. We now show that for any realized value
profile v ∈ V , such an auxiliary vector u can be constructed. We divide the argument into four cases. Recall
that we use ρ∗ = maxθ,i vi(θ) to denote the maximum value among all bidders’ values at all states, and i∗
denotes the bidder who has value ρ∗. Similarly, ρ∗∗ = maxi 6=i∗; θ vi(θ) is the maximum among all possible
valuations, excluding bidder i∗’th, and i∗∗ 6= i∗ denote a bidder who has the value ρ∗∗.
• Case 0: the bidder of the largest value is not unique. Let I denote the set of bidders with the largest
value v[1] in profile v. So |I| > 1. Construct w1, w2 ∈ Rn as follows. Let w1 = v; Let i˜ be the largest
index in I and define w2i = vi for all i 6∈ I , w2i˜ = v˜i and w
2
i = 0 for all i ∈ I, i 6= i˜. Note that
w1, w2 ∈ V = ∏ni=1 Vi, thus have strictly positive probabilities by our assumption that λ supports
on the entire set V . It is easy to verify that a mixture of w1 with probability 1 − ǫv[1] and w
2 with
probability ǫv[1]
results in an expected value profile u such that ui = vi for all i 6∈ I and u˜i = v[1],
ui = v[1] − ǫ for all i ∈ I, i 6= i˜. Such a u satisfies the conditions in Lemma D.1 for any arbitrarily
small ǫ. For the following analysis, we assume the vector v has a unique maximum value.
• Case 1: vi∗ ≤ ρ∗∗ and vi∗ is not the largest value in v. Let i˜ be the bidder with the largest value v[1],
thus v˜i = v[1] > vi∗ . Construct w
1, w2 ∈ Rn as follows. Let w1i = vi for all i 6= i∗, i˜, and w1i˜ = v[1],
w1i∗ = ρ
∗; let w2i = vi for all i 6= i˜, i∗, and w2i˜ = 0, w2i∗ = ρ∗. It is easy to see that a mixture of w1
with probability 1 − ǫv[1] and w
2 with probability ǫv[1]
results in an expected value profile u such that
ui = vi for all i 6= i˜, i∗ and u˜i = v[1] − ǫ, ui∗ = ρ∗.
• Case 2: vi∗ ≤ ρ∗∗ and vi∗ is the largest value in v, thus vi∗ = v[1]. Construct w1, w2 ∈ Rn as
follows. Let w1i = vi for all i 6= i∗∗, i∗, and w1i∗∗ = ρ∗∗, w1i∗ = ρ∗; let w2i = vi for all i 6= i∗∗, i∗, and
w2i∗∗ = ρ
∗∗,w2i∗ = 0. A mixture ofw
1 with probability
v[1]−ǫ
ρ∗ andw
2 with probability
ρ∗−v[1]+ǫ
ρ∗ results
in an expected auxiliary vector u such that ui = vi for all i 6= i∗∗, i∗ and ui∗∗ = ρ∗∗, ui∗ = v[1] − ǫ.
• Case 3: vi∗ > ρ∗∗, which happens with probability
∑
θ:vi∗ (θ)>ρ∗∗
λθ. This implies that bidder i
∗ must
have the highest value in v. Construct w1, w2 ∈ Rn as follows. Let w1i = vi for all i 6= i∗∗, i∗, and
w1i∗∗ = ρ
∗∗, w1i∗ = ρ
∗; let w2i = vi for all i 6= i∗∗, i∗, and w2i∗∗ = ρ∗∗, w2i∗ = 0. A mixture of w1 with
probability ρ
∗∗−ǫ
ρ∗ and w
2 with probability ρ
∗−ρ∗∗+ǫ
ρ∗ results in an expected auxiliary vector u such that
ui = vi for all i 6= i∗∗, i∗ and ui∗∗ = ρ∗∗, ui∗ = ρ∗∗ − ǫ. Therefore, the second highest value in u
is ρ∗∗ − ǫ, which is the revenue at the worst equilibrium (Lemma D.1). Since the full surplus is vi∗ ,
the revenue is at most vi∗ − ρ∗∗ + ǫ away from the full surplus. The aggregated surplus loss from this
case is thus
∑
θ:vi∗(θ)>ρ∗∗
λθ[vi∗(θ)− ρ∗∗ + ǫ], which is precisely the excluded term in Theorem 5.6,
up to an ǫ.
To sum up, the auxiliary vector u can be constructed for any value profile v. Moreover, the construction
corresponds to a signaling scheme that mixes two properly chosen value profiles w1, w2, as in the above case
analysis. We can then use the private signaling scheme in Lemma D.1 – i.e., revealing no information to
the bidder of the highest value in the auxiliary vector u and full information to all other bidders – to extract
almost full surplus from v. Note that the excluded term in Theorem 5.6 is mainly due to Case 3. Notice
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that the probability mass of the auxiliary vector u can be arbitrarily small so long as it is positive, therefore
the fact that a certain value profile is used for constructing auxiliary vectors has negligible effects when we
consider the revenue extracted from that value profile.
The above argument only shows the existence of a private signaling scheme that extracts almost the full
surplus. Next, we prove that this scheme can be implemented efficiently. In particular, given any realized
value profile v(θ), we will need to efficiently decide which signal to send with what probability. The main
issue here is, when v(θ) is needed for constructing auxiliary vectors, we have to identify all the value profiles
that use v(θ) to construct their auxiliary vectors, and signal accordingly. Our next lemma shows that this
can be done efficiently, thus completing the proof of Theorem 5.6.
Lemma D.2. The private signaling scheme above can be implemented in poly(n,
∑
i |Vi|) time.
Proof. We will show that given any realized value profile, we can explicitly check whether it is used for
constructing auxiliary vectors, and if so, of which value vectors. For convenience, we call the value profiles
that are used for constructing auxiliary vectors the basic vectors. A key observation is that for any given
v(θ), we can explicitly identify all value profiles (if any) that use v(θ) to construct their auxiliary vectors,
and there are only poly(
∑
i |Vi|) of them. This follows a tedious discussion, which essentially reverse the
above case analysis. We omit the details here.
With the above observation, we can now easily construct the desired private signaling scheme as follows.
Given any realized profile v(θ), let u be its auxiliary value profile as we constructed and i be the bidder of
the highest value in u. If v(θ) is not a basic vector, we simply reveal v(θ) to all the bidders except that we
tell bidder i the value profile is v(θ) with probability 1 − δ and u with probability δ, for some preset small
enough δ. If v(θ) is a basic vector. We first find all the (poly(
∑
i |Vi|) many) value profiles that use v(θ) to
construct auxiliary vectors. We can compute the probability needed from v(θ) for each such value profile,
and send the signal with corresponding probabilities by referring to the case analysis above. For the left
probability mass, we simply treat v(θ) as a basic vector and signal accordingly.
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